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SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS RELEVANCE TO NATIVE
AMERICANS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Hurst Hannum*
Before I begin, let me make clear that I speak to you today as an
international lawyer, not as an expert in the complex area of Native American
law. I have been asked to address the issue of sovereignty from that
international perspective, rather than to examine the concept from the more
specialized viewpoint of an Indian or constitutional lawyer. Thus, without
minimizing the potential use of sovereignty in the purely domestic context,
my primary focus will be the significance of international law - or the lack
of it - on the issue of Native American sovereignty.
Some Definitions
Sovereignty has been the cornerstone of the international legal order for at
least three-and-one-half centuries. Its development is most often traced to the
1848 Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe and
replaced the hierarchical structure of the Pope and Holy Roman Emperor with
a horizontal structure of independent sovereign states, theoretically equal in
authority and legal legitimacy.! Despite its fundamental nature, however,
there is no commonly accepted definition of sovereignty. The situation has
changed little from that described by Oppenheim in 1905:
[T]here exists perhaps no conception the meaning of which is
more controversial than that of sovereignty. It is an indisputable
fact that this conception, from the moment when it was introduced
into political science until the present day, has never had a
meaning which was universally agreed upon?
Without entering into the intricacies of political theory, for our purposes,
sovereignty may be understood as constitutional or legal independence. Even
this definition may need to be nuanced somewhat, because states may delegate
a wide range of powers to other entities, but it underscores the fact that a
sovereign power is subject to no legal constraints other than those imposed by
international law.
*Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
University.
1. All basic international texts address the general issue of sovereignty. In addition,
interesting political or historical approaches to the subject may be found in JENs BARTELSON, A
GENEALOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995); MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW,
POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE (1995); FRANcIs H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY (1986); and
ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD (1986).
2. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (1905).
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More important than defining sovereignty is identifying and understanding
the purposes that the concept of sovereignty serves, in terms of allocating
authority among the various institutions that exercise political power over
individuals. The first purpose, which one might term the "positive" aspect of
sovereignty, is to bestow legitimacy on the exercise of political power. No
political or legal system can function without coercive machinery to enforce
compliance with the decrees of the ruling authority. Where the ruling
authority is a state, the concept of sovereignty legitimizes the acts of that
state. Although the citizens of the state may be the theoretical source of
sovereign power,3 it is the state that is imbued by the international order with
the legal cloak of sovereignty.
Of course, sovereignty is not the only (or even the most important) means
of legitimizing the exercise of power. Certain kinds of authority stem from
religious or moral precepts, and community and peer values may be
recognized as providing a legitimate basis for forms of social coercion.
Sovereignty is relevant only to political power, primarily that exercised by
states, which are themselves simply one particular form of political
organization.
A second, "negative" or defensive purpose of sovereignty is to permit one
political unit to defend itself from encroachment by another political unit. A
sovereign need not obey the commands of another entity, absent an agreement
between the two to the contrary. In this context, the primary issue is that of
functional competence - to whom does authority belong? - rather than
legitimacy.
Third, sovereignty is a useful construction that enables external actors to
identify the locus of political power within a state; it clarifies expectations of
behavior (who is empowered to do what?) and permits greater certainty in
international relations. On the other hand, enforceable agreements between
states and nonstate entities can take many forms, and possession of
sovereignty is not a necessary prerequisite to entering into binding
agreements.
It might be noted that there is no requirement that a sovereign state
participate in international relations, although it may be held accountable by
others for the observance of customary international legal norms. Likewise,
it is possible for nonsovereign entities to have international legal personalities,
acquire membership in international organizations, and participate directly in
economic institutions.
It might be useful at this point to distinguish between the related (and often
confused) concepts of sovereignty, self-determination, and statehood. The
classic definition of a state is found in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on
3. Despite the advances in international human rights law since adoption of the Universal
Declantion of Human Rights in 1948, we have not yet arrived at the time when international law




Rights and Duties of States, which provides that a state should possess a
permanent population, a defined territory, government, and the capacity to
enter into relations with other states.4 Another common concept of the state
underscores its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Under any definition,
there is an implication that the entity has the ability to exercise the normal
functions of a state (policing, operating a legal system, national defense, etc.).
Today, all states are theoretically sovereign, no matter what their actual
degree of political or economic independence.
As already mentioned, sovereignty may be defined in many ways.
However, whether sovereignty is defined as the final and absolute authority
in a political community' or as constitutional independence,6 many questions
remain unanswered. Where does sovereignty lie in a federation or
confederation? In the United States, despite the theoretical sovereignty of each
individual state, the practical meaning of sovereignty changed considerably
after the U.S. Civil War. Does sovereignty lie with the monolithic, unitary
state per se (as maintained by Hobbes), or with the people, under Rousseau's
concept of popular sovereignty? Or is it a purely legal construct, related to
constitutionalism, as suggested by Kant?7
The right of self-determination in international law is the right of "peoples"
to choose their own political status, both internally (i.e., the form of
government) and externally (their relations with other authorities).' It is
frequently used as a rallying cry by ethnic entrepreneurs, as well as by those
with legitimate grievances, to demand greater political power and even
independent statehood. Whatever its political implications, however, the
internationally recognized right of self-determination has been limited to the
right of former colonial territories to independence; it does not presently
include a right of secession - although it should be noted that international
law does not prohibit secession, either.'
4. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 165 L.N.T.S. 19,
available in 1934 WL 5129.
5. HINSLEY, supra note 1, at 1.
6. JAMES, supra note 1, at 25.
7. See HINSLEY, supra note 1, at 141-57, for a brief description of these and other positions.
8. Among many recent or classical works on self-determination, see ANTONIO CASSESE,
SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL (1995); RUPERT EMERSON, SELF-
DETERMINATION REVISITED IN THE ERA OF DECOLONIZATION (1964); HURST HANNUM,
AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLCTING
RIGHTS (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter HANNUM, AUTONOMY]; Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-
Determination, 34 VA. J. INTL L. 1 (1993); A. RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT
OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1973); and MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION (Christian
Tomuschat ed., 1993).
9. See Hurst Hannum, The Specter of Secession: Responding to Ethnic Self-Determination
Claims, FOREIGN AFF., MarJApr. 1998, at 13; see supra sources cited note 8.
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Historical Development of Sovereignty and Statehood
In order to understand the meaning of sovereignty today and to evaluate
its relevance in the future, a sense of the historical development of the
concept is essential. At the risk of being slightly repetitive, let me summarize
that development very superficially.
Early political communities had no notion of sovereignty as the term is
understood today. They were stateless societies of tribal or lineage
communities in which there was no need for a "sovereign" government and
in which control was exercised pursuant to moral or social authority rather
than through law. Legitimacy arose from the daily operation of the
community and in conformity with its traditions.
From the time of the Greek city states and, later, the Roman empire, a
distinction began to be drawn between manmade laws adopted by the
community and higher religious laws. Because ultimate authority and
legitimacy flowed from the gods, there was still no need for a separate
conception of sovereignty to provide legitimacy to the rulers - so long as
they acted in accordance with divine law. This system continued through the
Middle Ages, although neither the Pope (in the Holy Roman Empire) nor the
Caliph (in the Ottoman Empire) was able to exercise real control over the
political system he theoretically headed.
The gradual separation of positive-secular law from divine-religious law in
Europe culminated in the Treaty of Westphalia, which replaced the previous
hierarchical structure with an international order based on the sovereign
equality of states. That order continues to be the foundation of international
law tcday, although it is under increasing pressure from the growing number
of nonstate actors - including international organizations, nongovernmental
organizations, and substate political entities - that participate in and
influence international affairs.
The equation of a political unit (the state) with a single ethnic, cultural, or
linguistic group reached its apogee in the nineteenth century, when assertions
of nationalism led to the creation of Germany and Italy, as well as claims for
autonomy within multinational states and empires." -Nationalist principles
10. There are even more works on nationalism than on sovereignty. Among the better known
books are BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1991); JOHN BREUILLY, NATIONALISM
AND THE STATE (2d ed. 1993); ROGERS BRUBAKER, NATIONALISM REFRAMED (1996); WALKER
CONNOR, ETHNONATIONALISM, THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING (1993); THOMAS HYLLAND
ERIKSEN, ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM, ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (1993); ERNEST
GELLNIIR, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983); LIAH GREENFELD, NATIONALISM, FIVE ROADS
TO MODERNITY (1992); E.J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780 (2d ed. 1992);
ELIE KEDOURIE, NATIONALISM (4th ed. 1993); ANTHONY D. SMITH, THE ETHNIC ORIGINS OF
NATIONS (1988); ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONAL IDENTITY (1991); YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL
NATIONALISM (1993); and PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, THE ETHNIC PHENOMENON (1981). A




provided a rough guideline for the creation of new states in the aftermath of
World War I, following the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman
empires, although these principles were hardly applied in a consistent manner.
At the same time, however, the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw
a plethora of complex arrangements among states and other entities that
reflected the variety of political arrangements that existed in the world, such
as suzerainty, protectorates, dependencies, colonies, dominions, etc."
The Contemporary Understanding of Sovereignty
By the mid-twentieth century, after the creation of the United Nations and
under the impetus of decolonization, the "sovereign state" had come to be
viewed by many as the only desirable and acceptable form of government.
Any outcome of decolonization other than full independence was viewed with
suspicion, and rarely were colonial territories permitted to change their
borders upon achieving independence. The ethnic imperative of the nineteenth
century had been replaced by the territorial imperative of the twentieth
century.
The territory of the world is now essentially covered by sovereign states,"
and the problems of an unalterable fixing of borders based on the principle
of territorial integrity are becoming apparent. The resurgence of ethnic
identity and conflict in the late twentieth century is, in many respects, an
attempt to return to the cultural-linguistic focus of a century ago. While the
demands of many groups for "self-determination" often focus on statehood as
the ultimate goal, there also is increasing evidence of a willingness to
formulate new arrangements of autonomy, minority rights, delegated powers,
etc., that seek to arrive at realistic modes of power-sharing rather than to
insist on formal delineations of sovereignty. 3
Despite their "sovereign equality," the degree of independence actually
exercised by states obviously varies greatly. Academics continue to debate
whether sovereignty is indivisible (one is either sovereign or not) or functional
(the rights and obligations of a sovereign state may vary), 4 but all agree that
sovereignty is not absolute. Today, the rights and duties of states are
constrained by customary international law and often wide-ranging treaty
D. Smith eds., 1994).
11. For a brief description of some of these arrangements, see HANNUM, AUTONOMY, supra
note 8, at 16-19. See generally WAV. WILLOUGHBY & C.G. FENWICK, TYPES OF RESTRICTED
SOVEREIGNTY AND OF COLONIAL AUTONOMY (1919); 1 MARJORIE M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 221-598 (1963).
12. There remain only 17 colonial territories recognized as such by the United Nations, most
of them small islands controlled by either the United States or the United Kingdom.
13. See generally HANNUM, AUTONOMY, supra note 8.
14. See FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 1, at 63-82 (discussing the "chunk" versus "basket"
theories of sovereignty).
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obligations. States may yield "sovereignty" or delegate powers over, e.g.,
national defense (Micronesia), judicial appeals (Jamaica and other members
of the Commonwealth), or economic policy (the European Union). State
action is constrained, by international norms concerning human rights, the
environment, and the use of force in ways that have significantly altered the
permissible content of sovereignty from its parameters in the seventeenth
through the nineteenth centuries.
In some instances, the myth of theoretical sovereign equality is increasingly
difficult to maintain. One commentator has suggested that small, weak states
have become de facto international protectorates or "quasi-states," i.e., no
longer fair game for conquest (as would have been the case under traditional
international law) but not really capable of exercising truly sovereign powers
on their own. 5 The UN Security Council has sanctioned interventions in
Haiti, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and elsewhere to quell civil wars that would
earlier have been thought to be beyond the scope of legitimate international
interest. It is difficult to understand the meaning of "sovereignty" in anarchic
Somalia or occupied Bosnia and Hercegovina. Similarly, the recognition by
many countries of Palestine and Western Sahara as states seems farcical,
because neither entity exercises effective control over what it claims as its
territory.
Even given all of these theoretical and practical problems, it is true,
without a doubt, that sovereignty "will remain a sturdy foundation for the
superstructure of international politics for years to come." 6 At the same
time, however, the increasing complexity and interdependence of the modern
world require us to look beyond the stark extremes of "statehood or nothing,"
or sovereignty versus dependency. Granting too much significance to
sovereignty and statehood may obscure the real interests of parties in sharing
or dividing power, and it makes more difficult the articulation of new forms
of relationships among and within states, governments, and peoples.
Sovereignty and Native Americans
During the past two decades, indigenous peoples have emerged as a distinct
subject of international law. 7 In 1989, the International Labor Organization
revised its assimilationist Convention No. 107"8 by adopting a more
progressive Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
15. ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND
THE THIRD WORLD (1990).
16. FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 1, at 164.
17. See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996);
THE RIGHTs OF PEOPLES (James Crawford ed., 1988).
18 Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal
and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (I.L.O. No. 107), June 26, 1957,




Independent Countries (I.L.O. No. 1969)." In 1993, the U.N. Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
adopted a draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which is
presently under consideration by the Sub-Commission's parent body, the
Commission on Human Rights.
Indigenous representatives, including many from North America,
participated actively in drafting the Declaration, and, in many respects, it
represents the aspirations of indigenous peoples worldwide. The draft does
refer specifically to the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, but
there is no reference to indigenous sovereignty. And while the former is still
considered to be controversial by some governments, any reference to
indigenous peoples as "sovereign" would undoubtedly meet with unanimous
opposition from states.
Even though it ignores sovereignty per se, the draft Declaration identifies
most of the significant powers that "sovereign" indigenous governments would
wish to assert, including the ability to define their own membership; establish
their own government institutions; participate in national decision making that
affects them; and control their territory, environment, natural resources, and
economic development. The Declaration also calls for restitution of lands
illegally taken, the observance of treaties entered into by indigenous peoples,
and mechanisms to resolve disputes with states.
What does all of this have to do with Native Americans? The UN
Declaration is unlikely to be adopted in the near future, and its legal impact
on the United States will be minimal. Nonetheless, as "domestic, dependent
nations," tribal governments within the United States have long been
distinguished by a unique political status, even though U.S. and foreign
governments have consistently proclaimed that tribes are not "states" in the
international sense and do not possess international personality.
The reservation to Congress of plenary powers over the tribes, however,
undermines the unique status and "self-determination" that Native Americans
theoretically enjoy. Both the negative (protective) and positive (assertive)
powers inherent in sovereignty are needed by Native American governments
to prevent unwanted Congressional revocation of existing powers and, in some
cases, to expand the scope of tribal authority. Does this suggest that the
maintenance or reassertion of tribal sovereignty is the answer?
On a visit to Pueblo communities in New Mexico [in February
1998], Speaker Newt Gingrich told Indian leaders that he had
trouble understanding the concept of tribal sovereignty ....
19. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June
27, 1989, 72 I.L.O. Off. Bull. 59.
20. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Report of the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations, 11th Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, 105-115, 34 I.L.M. 541
(Oct. 28, 1994).
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The president of the Navajo Nation, Albert Hale, offered Mr.
Gingrich an explanation, telling him how an Indian leader would
prefer to be treated.
"When I come to Washington, you don't send me to the Bureau
of Indian Affairs," said Mr. Hale, leader of a tribe with nearly a
quarter-million members. "You have a state dinner for me."
A week after the visit, Mr. Hale announced that the Navajo
might block all roads for one day into their vast reservation, an
area the size of West Virginia, as a demonstration of sovereignty.
Three states overlap Navajo lands, and Mr. Hale's suggestion set
off harsh criticism by members of his own tribe as well as
neighboring communities ....
Mr. Hale has since resigned, under pressure over financial and
personal improprieties, and the roadblock idea has yet to be
revived."
This anecdote illustrates two things. First, it exemplifies the reluctance on
the part of non-Indian Americans even to consider the prospect of 554
"sovereign" nations within the United States, in addition to the fifty existing
"sovereign" states. In addition, even if sovereignty might be meaningful for
the Navajo, it is more difficult to comprehend the relevance of sovereignty to
much smaller nations, some of which number only in the hundreds.'
Second, however, the attitudes of both Gingrich and Hale demonstrate the
confusion that bald assertions of undefined "sovereignty" are likely to create,
as opposed to encouraging a more rational debate over the appropriate scope
of tribal powers. State dinners and roadblocks are not the issues, and neither
the recognition nor the denial of Native American sovereignty will
automatically result in an appropriate division of powers among tribal, state,
and ft1deral governments.
In the international context, I have often criticized the insistence by
minorities, national liberation movements, and states on symbolic declarations
of sovereignty, self-determination, or national unity, since these slogans
obscure the real issues in dispute between central governments and regional,
minority, or indigenous groups. Given the peculiar history of tribal
sovereignty in the United States, however, it would seem to me to be a
mistake to abandon the concept at this stage.
At the same time, because sovereignty is not absolute, recognizing or
reasserting tribal sovereignty does not automatically imply that every tribal act
supersedes any inconsistent act by another government. Similarly, there are
21. Timothy Egan, New Prosperity Brings New Conflict to Indian Country, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
8, 1998, at 3.
22. Some of these issues are raised in Robert A. Fairbanks, Native American Sovereignty and




no minimal powers inherent in sovereignty, except perhaps the ability to
define one's own membership and the nature of governmental institutions, so
the content of sovereignty must be negotiated.
Perhaps it is time for a new compact or agreement between Native
American tribes and the federal government, to articulate the minimum
content of the reserved (or delegated) authority of the tribes. Such an
approach might offer the possibility to tribes of "opting in" to assume greater
powers and responsibilities, so that larger, better organized tribes could
exercise greater powers than smaller communities.
Of course, there is also a risk that any such new compact might bring
(U.S.) states into the picture and create a three-way relationship that would
not always operate to the benefit of the tribes. However, talk of tribal
authority or sovereignty in the face of Congress' plenary power to override
that authority is problematic, at best. Meaningful tribal authority and
responsibility must rest on a firmer basis than the whims of Congress, and it
may be time even to consider whether a constitutional amendment might be
the best way in which appropriate guarantees can be ensured.
In summary, sovereignty per se is not the solution, although sovereignty
remains a valuable concept that Native Americans may use to argue for
retaining residual and treaty rights. But both parties also need to recognize -
in any relationship short of complete tribal independence - that defining the
extent of respective governmental powers requires mutual consent and the
accommodation of often conflicting rights and interests. Law, whether
domestic or international, cannot provide easy answers to the complex
problem of how Native American governments will relate to other
governments and citizens in the twenty-first century.
As Chief Justice Yazzie said at the Sovereignty Symposium, "To know
where you are going, you need to know who you are." I would add that, to
decide whether or not sovereignty is the answer, you also need to know what
you want to do when you get to where you are going.
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